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Conceptualising peace and its preconditions: The anti-Pelagian imagination and the critical 
turn in peace theory 
 
Sophia Dingli, University of Glasgow 
 
Abstract: This article examines the conceptualisation of peace and its preconditions manifested in 
the critical turn in peace theory: bottom-up approaches which begin with particular contexts and 
postulate diverse local actors as integral to the process of peace-building. This article argues that a 
turn is at an impasse and is unable to address the crucial charge that its conceptualization of peace is 
inconsistent. To explain the persistence of inconsistency and to move us forward, the article 
analyses, evaluates and responds to the turn through the lens of Nicholas Rengger’s work on the 
anti-Pelagian imagination in political theory. This is defined as a tendency to begin theorising from 
non-utopian, anti-perfectionist and sceptical assumptions. Through this examination the article 
argues that the critical turn is anti-Pelagian but not consistently so because it often gives way to 
perfectionism, adopts naïve readings of institutions and postulates demanding conceptions of 
political agency and practice. This inconsistency with its own philosophical premises makes the 
turn’s conceptualisation of peace and its preconditions incoherent. Finally, the article sketches an 
alternative account of peace which draws upon a number of anti-Pelagian scholars and mobilises 
Rengger’s particular defense of anti-Pelagianism. The suggested alternative, the article argues, 
provides us with a more coherent position and a way out of existing dead ends. 
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The critical turn in peace theory1 is at an impasse. Having successfully challenged the hegemony of 
the liberal peace the turn has been mired in endless and somewhat repetitive debates, the most 
significant of which between critical and problem-solving accounts (Chandler and Richmond, 2015; 
Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015) and between Eurocentric and properly de-colonial approaches 
(Sabaratnam, 2013; Shani, 2019). Though these debates have been valuable, they have yet to 
effectively confront or resolve the most damaging challenges to the critical turn: the argument that 
the critical turn’s conceptualization of peace is inconsistently critical because its proponents do not 
adequately acknowledge their own positionalities and the political nature of their suggestions 
(Randazzo, 2016) and the argument that the critical turn threatens the transvaluation of peace itself 
(Bargués-Pedreny, 2018). Existing critiques have been unable to effectively explain the underlying 
reasons for and the persistence of these issues. Moreover, they have been either uninterested or 
unwilling to suggest alternative conceptualisations which may help us out of the current impasse and 
that can counteract the transvaluation of the concept of peace inherent in the critical turn.   
 
This article addresses this twin problem by employing the framework of analysis of non-teleological 
and sceptical political thought outlined by the late Nicholas Rengger (2017). As I show below, this 
framework is appropriate to an analysis and evaluation of the conceptualisation of and preconditions 
for peace found in the critical turn because these accounts are premised on the three philosophical 
assumptions that Rengger argues characterise what he called ‘the anti-Pelagian imagination’ in 
political theory. These assumptions are 1) a complex understanding of human nature and institutions, 
2) a non-teleological understanding of politics and 3) scepticism regarding the ability of theory to 
positively affect practice. It is the article’s contention that though they have not claimed the label for 
themselves, theorists in the critical turn can be accurately characterized as anti-Pelagians. Through 
an analysis of the framework and by using it to read and analyse the turn, the article illustrates that a 
fundamental problem for the turn is that it is not consistent in its adherence to this set of underlying 
assumptions. This leads it to fall into one of the traps that anti-Pelagian thought tends to: 
perfectionism. Thus, the article demonstrates that the underlying reason behind the impasse in the 
critical turn in peace theory is that it indulges in some forms of ontological and teleological 
perfectionism which undermine the consistency and coherence of its theorization of peace.  
 
Moreover, by mobilizing Rennger’s type of anti-Pelagianism, found in his own work and in the work 
of theorists he admired, this article proposes an alternative conceptualisation of peace and its 
 
1 Here it should be noted that since the end of the Cold War a great proportion of peace theory (liberal and critical) has 
been concerned with inter-state peace. This is because the end of the Cold War led to an explosion of inter-state 
conflict. It is also reflective of the argument, made originally by Kant in the 18th century, that getting peace ‘right’ 
within states is a precondition for peace between them. The critical turn deals predominantly with intra-state peace. 
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preconditions. This takes the form of accounting for and accepting the more general patterns of our 
politics, studied by anti-Pelagians and to an extent embraced by the critical turn, and developing a 
formal rather than substantive conceptualisation of peace and its preconditions which is consistent 
with those patterns and coherent in itself. Thus, the conception developed here provides a much 
needed alternative and corrective to the theorization of peace current in the existing literature. 
 
The article proceeds in three sections. The first section outlines Rengger’s framework. The second 
section analyses and evaluates the critical turn’s approach to peace. The final section sketches an 
alternative conceptualisation which draws from the work of Rengger and various anti-Pelagian 
thinkers. Finally, the conclusion discusses the consequences of this approach. 
 
Rengger’s study and critique of anti-Pelagian political and international theory 
A significant portion of Nicholas Rengger’s work was concerned with pessimistic, sceptical, anti-
perfectionist and non-utopian thought. This took the form of engaging with particular authors 
including Michael Oakeshott, Bernard Williams, Judith Shklar and John Gray, among others, whose 
work explicitly opposed what Rengger called the ‘Pelagian’ character of modern political and 
international thought. This characterisation, which is not unique to Rengger but has been a stable of 
debates in political theory (Fuller, 1996; Paipais, 2016), takes its name from the British monk Pelagius 
who in the 5th century denied the doctrine of original sin and that salvation could only come through 
the Grace of God. Instead, Pelagius held that human beings were intrinsically good and could aim for 
and will perfection (Rengger, 2017: 4). Rengger contends that from the seventeenth century onwards 
political and international thought can be seen as a secularised version of the Pelagian heresy 
manifested in attempts to ‘rationalise’ institutions to solve, once and for all, perennial political 
problems such as poverty, inequality, conflict and war. Post-17th century political theory is 
predominantly Pelagian since it presupposes that human beings can find ‘deliverance’ from politics 
through the right type of political system. Pelagian political and international theories, according to 
Rengger (2017), entail the following three elements: an understanding of human nature and 
institutions as perfectible; a teleological conception of the end of politics as a secularised version of 
salvation - a utopia, which can be willed into existence, and a conception of political theory as a map 
to achieving it.2  
 
 
2 Here it should be noted that Rengger’s pre-occupation with the debate between Pelagian anti-Pelagian thought shares 
some similarities with the debate between ideal, non-ideal and realist theory which has been raging in political theory 
since at least 2008 (Geuss, 2008; Sleat, 2016) and has recently ‘migrated’ to international political theory (Brown and 
Eckersley, 2018). Though he deals with some thinkers engaged in those debates Rengger’s analysis is related but distinct 
from the framework established by the existing debates. 
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A prime example of Pelagian political theory, according to Rengger, is ‘democratic peace theory’ 
which is inexorably related to the ‘liberal peace’. In his critique of the theory he identified a number 
of flaws but here we focus in particular on the theory’s Pelagian character which according to Rengger 
(2016: 50) manifests thusly:  
It assumes that the problem of war is essentially solvable if we move away from political and 
social forms that encourage it (monarchy or the ‘martial spirit’) and towards political and 
social forms that discourage it (liberal republics/democracies) and that there is an historical 
process that can bring this about. This has given liberal and democratic thinking about peace 
in general an institutional flavour which has permeated much of the international relations 
theory of the twentieth century. 
Here we might add that the theory’s institutional flavour entailed the belief that theory could and 
should become action, a belief which was embraced by the UN for two decades with disappointing 
results.  
 
Anti-Pelagian scepticism in Rengger’s reading follows from a number of different ontological 
assumptions. For example, for Christian realists like Martin Wight and Jean Bethke Elshtain 
scepticism stems from metaphysical pessimism (Rengger, 2017: 23-34; 120-22). On the other hand, 
for ‘dystopic liberals’- liberals who defend a limited liberalism of toleration as opposed to more 
ambitious utopian projects of rational consensus and redistribution- scepticism stems from decidedly 
non-metaphysical premises: recalling the historical memory of human-made atrocities (Rengger, 
2017: 64-79) For others yet, like John Gray (Rengger, 2017: 98-110) scepticism results from a 
recognition of the imperfect and contingent nature of human reason and from an appreciation of 
permanent and ineradicable pluralism. Despite significant differences, the anti-Pelagian imagination 
as a whole ‘finds human experience to be so varied and complex that no plan for ordering and 
reconstructing human affairs could ever succeed.’ (Fuller, 1996: ix) Politics, in this account, might 
help us keep the ship afloat but will not deliver us to the promised land. 
 
Rengger’s final book engages with a number of anti-Pelagian thinkers to highlight the diversity, of 
anti-Pelagian thought -which counts liberals, realists and critical theorists in its numbers, and the 
difficulty in articulating a consistent and coherent anti-Pelagian position. The difficulty, according to 
Rengger, is two-fold. On the one hand, he shows that anti-Pelagians themselves often inadvertently 
slip into Pelagianism in the form of giving way to perfectionist/utopian tendencies, leading them to 
reach conclusions inconsistent with their premises and/or to formulate incoherent/ self-contradictory 
theories by trying to serve two opposing agendas. A pertinent example of inconsistency is the case of 
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‘dystopic liberals’ like Williams, who while rejecting ‘moralism’3 and in an effort to secure the 
otherwise modest goal of negative liberty, argued for the necessity of ethical, hence pre-political, 
preconditions for legitimacy, like adherence to human rights (Rengger, 2017: 68-69). An example of 
incoherence is Hedley Bull in whose earlier work Rengger identified an ambiguity between 
scepticism and perfectionism. Bull’s work, according to Rengger (2017: 19-34), became increasingly 
incoherent, as he embraced moral universalism, while not abandoning scepticism. 
 
The second difficulty facing anti-Pelagian thought is the tendency to become ‘the mirror image of 
what it opposes’ (Rengger, 2017: 5). Rengger’s targets here are thinkers like Gray, Shklar, Leo 
Strauss and Hans Morgenthau. Though these are very different thinkers, Rengger critiques their work 
along two broad lines. First, he argues that their reading of politics in general is far too pessimistic, 
reliant on generalisations of complex phenomena. For example, Rengger argues that Gray’s latest 
work, is deeply pessimistic about modern political thought which he claims amounts to a secularised 
form of apocalyptic religious thinking. However, Rengger (2017: 98-108) cautions against this 
pessimism, arguing that ‘religion’ is a far more complex phenomenon than Gray allows and that not 
all religious thought is apocalyptic and thus utopian. He charges that Gray’s overly pessimistic 
reading leads to a skewed reading of religion, of Christian thought and of the debt of the realism Gray 
favours to Christian scepticism. Rengger also objects to the general pessimistic readings of the human 
condition found in the work of anti-Pelagians like Morgenthau and Shklar. Describing the human 
condition as ‘tragic’ or ‘dystopic’ as Morgenthau and Shklar do respectively, Rengger argued (2017: 
162-68; 76-77), would be to describe perfectly ordinary and human phenomena as extraordinary and 
as a reason for pessimism and exceptional action. The pessimism these theorists express according to 
Rengger is inconsistent with a complex understanding of human beings who are both greedy and 
charitable, avaricious and merciful. The second criticism is that in trying to oppose Pelagian 
tendencies of perfectionism, theorists tend to a ‘nostalgia for a better-ordered past’ which often leads 
to theorising which closely resembles rationalistic prescription or to ‘a return to utopia, however 
inverted or misconceived’(Rengger, 2017: 166-67; 108).  
 
Rengger prefers a third tentative position which he develops by the end of his book that is influenced 
primarily by Oakeshott’s idealism and distinct ‘moral sensibility’. Firstly, Rengger follows Oakeshott 
(1966) in stating, contra realists like Morgenthau, that we do not have access to ‘the world’ but only 
to our understandings of it which is always conditional upon the mode of our engagement. He argues 
that political theory and practice are related in that political theory must truthfully reflect practice if 
 
3 Whereby pre-political, moral imperatives either provide limits to political action or direct it (Williams, 2005: ch.1) 
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it is to understand it, while it can also help correct misunderstandings of political practice for either 
the public or practitioners by resisting ‘false attempts to portray the world in a different 
light’(Rengger, 2017: 167). However, he insists that political theory cannot itself become practice 
(Rengger, 2017: 167). This is because theory and practice have different ends: the theorist’s goal is 
better understanding of political conduct the practitioner’s more prudent doing. Writing political 
theory with an eye on ‘doing’ corrupts understanding since it engenders simplifications and the 
temptation in normative theory to be swayed by wishful thinking or a desire to arrest, once and for 
all, inevitable complications and messiness.  
 
This position denies that theory should be primarily measured by its usefulness for practice and 
affirms the now unfashionable notion that theorising as a mode of experience is valuable because it 
enables us to see the character of the world more clearly. Thus, the relative success or failure of 
particular theories is determined by the end of theorizing which, according to Oakeshott (1996: 20) 
is:   
to distinguish the more permanent elements of the pattern of our politics, to accept them, not in 
the degree in which they are acceptable (for that becomes irrelevant) but in the degree in which 
they are unavoidable … to find oneself a little less perplexed and a little more understanding of 
the unpleasing surface of politics.  
Consequently, though theory is necessarily related to practice and can help us evaluate it, from the 
outside, conflating doing and theorising is a non-starter since it wrongly presumes that there is carry-
over from theory to practice (Rengger, 2017: 166–68). This position is not only different to ‘ideal’ 
and realist theory, it is also distinct from the metatheoretical claims of critical theory, which presumes 
that theoretical construction necessarily breeds domination, since this wrongly presumes the 
identification of theory with practice and disregards the fact that theorists often have little effect on 
practice, predominantly because they are terrible rhetoricians as Rengger (2017: 16) argues. This is 
of course not to claim that theory never carries over into practice, rather it is to illuminate their 
distinction and that there is no necessary link between the two; rather, any carry-over is often 
accidental and contingent.  
 
This distinction is crucial for Rengger’s brand of anti-Pelagianism and important for the argument 
made in this article. Rengger does not dispute that Frankfurt-school-style Critical Theory is anti-
Pelagian in nature. However, he charges that it is mistaken in assuming that solely critiquing other 
theories is the only defendable position for the reasons given above. Thus, the theorists Rengger 
engages with both critique existing theorisations and also theorise different phenomena by starting 
with ‘the more permanent elements of the pattern of our politics’. Rengger (2013) for example 
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critiqued well-meaning and increasingly permissive theories of the use of force by examining the 
pattern of war and international (dis)order. This article’s final section seeks to do something similar 
with our understanding of ‘peace’.  
By its nature any such theorisation is formal, even universal. However, it is crucial to note that it is 
interpretive rather than prescriptive. In other words, its aim is to provide clearer understanding rather 
than a ‘how to guide’ or any institutional recommendations. Thus, anti-Pelagian thinking might be 
universal but it is not universalising. Furthermore, any such theorisation starts with the assumption 
that it can never provide ‘an absolute position, an ultimate ground of decision or choice’ (Rengger, 
2016: 53). At this point the reader might reasonably contend that despite all these caveats, any 
theorisation produced would be to an extent ethnocentric. While I must concede that the tradition of 
anti-Pelagian thinking outlined here has been developed in the West, drawing upon particular 
resources including Judeo-Christian thought, arguing that this means that it cannot produce any 
formal or universal theory would be to give into absolute relativism, a position which is contentious 
to say the least. Acknowledging the particularity of this and any approach and embracing pluralism, 
as Rengger (2015: 36) argued, ‘does not by any stretch of the imagination imply that one approach 
cannot be correct and others incorrect’. His response to the reality of difference and to his own 
particular position, which I share, was first to urge humility and secondly to reject absolute relativism 
which suggests ‘that all truth claims are relative to the perspective of the person doing the 
claiming’(Rengger, 2015: 36). Consequently, though general and universal, anti-Pelagian theories do 
not preclude different reasonable theories, including ones formulated in different contexts. Indeed, 
they are best read as making a modest claim: that they are plausible thus worthy to be admitted to the 
larger conversation and debate and that they should be judged by the standards by which we judge 
political theorising: that they are consistent with the facts and within themselves. 
The following section reads the critical turn through the prism of the anti-Pelagian imagination and 
evaluates it by these standards, while the final section develops an alternative theorisation of peace 
and its preconditions which aims to be more consistent and coherent.  
On the inconsistent anti-Pelagianism of the critical turn 
The critical turn in peace theory entails a number of different responses to the conundrum of post-
Cold War peace-making which foreground local contexts –in terms of the agency, norms and effects 
of peace-making. It is a reaction to what became known as the ‘liberal peace’ which is the latest 
manifestation of liberal internationalism. The term, as it is usually used, does not connote a unified 
set of policies. Instead, it captures ‘the ideology of peacemaking, the socio-cultural norms of 
peacemaking, the structural factors that enable and constrain it, its principal actors and clients, and 
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its manifestations’ (Mac Ginty, 2010: 393). The liberal peace that the critical turn sought to critique 
and correct was Pelagian in origin and made the following errors. First it presumed that liberalism 
was non-partisan (Sleat, 2013: 363), discounting the variability of the human experience and 
expressions of the good, and limits to our understanding and knowledge. Thus, it offered a vision of 
a global order based on the assumption of the disappearance of competing versions of the good life, 
both secular and religious. This was a fully anti-political conceptualisation and one which entailed a 
belief in the ability of people to construct political and economic institutions which could bring this 
order into existence.  
 
The critical turn draws upon Critical Theory, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and feminism. This 
grouping should not be taken as an indication of uniformity or even agreement among different 
scholars, as we will see. Despite their differences critical works are characterised by two common 
concerns: revealing the dominating silences of the ‘liberal peace’ (and post-liberal peace-making) 
and proposing different epistemologies and methodologies that would allow theorists and 
practitioners to listen to the silences of the subaltern. In addition, many critical works have been 
concerned with theorizing the conditions for the construction of a silence-free, positive peace.4 These 
approaches are commonly anti-Pelagian since they start from the complexity of peace-building 
environments where the conceptions of the good and the interests of local and international actors are 
diverse and often in conflict. Further, they highlight the permanence of power and conflict -in short 
of politics- in the process of peace-making. The following discussion touches upon all three elements 
of the critical turn, focusing on the third, since this most closely relates to our concern with the 
conceptualisation of peace. 
 
The critique 
Theorists of the critical turn accuse ‘liberal peace’ theorists of producing three types of dominating 
silence: epistemic, cultural and structural. Critics point to the epistemic silence over the conditions 
that produced the ‘liberal peace’ present in the works of policy-makers and scholars. In particular, 
they argue that the ‘liberal peace’ did not seek to respond to the horror of intra-state wars but to the 
danger that the proliferation of ‘failed states’ posed to international security (Richmond, 2009: 564). 
As a result, the goal of the ‘liberal peace’ was not to emancipate local populations but to provide 
security for the leading states of the Global North. A similar accusation has been waged against the 
‘liberal peace’s’ insistence that marketisation is conducive to liberty and economic development. 
Rather than serving those goals, Michael Pugh (2006: 271) argues, ‘peace operations can be 
 
4 Here it should be noted that not all critical peace scholars  partake in this final exercise, however we focus on those 
who do in line with the subject of the article.  
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considered an integral part of the world ordering project that has accompanied projects for stabilizing 
capitalism.’  
 
These epistemic silences are related to a number of cultural/ideological silences -the sort of silences 
that legitimise structural silencing - produced in the power imbalance between the interveners and 
intervened. First is the silence imposed upon the have-nots both in scholarship and policy and, 
secondly, that imposed by Eurocentrism, which was constitutive of the conviction that the ‘liberal 
peace’ was a manifestation of universal values, when it was a manifestation of particularly Western 
ones (Jahn, 2007; Richmond, 2011: 1; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 768). These silences 
(re)produced structural inequalities which served, critics argued, to further marginalise the poor while 
safeguarding the interests of interveners and local elites.  
 
These critiques effectively recovered the political, thus non-teleological, nature of peace-making 
from the clutches of Pelagian notions of the ‘end of history’. They challenged depoliticisation by 
rejecting the argument that peace could be built on a priori principles which ignored context, and 
which presumed the disappearance of different versions of the good or of conflicting material 
interests. They also indicated the illiberal means by which the liberal peace had been enforced 
(Chandler, 2006). Finally, critics illustrated that the peace constructed at the end of ‘liberal peace’ 
interventions was not liberal but hybrid: a contingent amalgam of local and liberal practices whose 
composition depended on many variables including the robustness of local institutions (Mac Ginty, 
2011).  
 
Listening for peace 
In addition to revealing the silences of the ‘liberal peace’, the critical turn has been committed to 
listening to the voices of the subaltern. Thus, they suggest different ontologies, epistemologies and 
methodologies for those studying peace-making or partaking in it. Generally, critical peace theorists 
adopt reflexive and relational ontologies, which then lead to the abandonment of a privilege 
standpoint in either studying or practicing peace-making. These commitments entail an anti-Pelagian 
awareness of the limits of human knowledge and of the political nature of peace-making. For 
example, Oliver Richmond (2016: 17) argues that the study of what he terms ‘peace formation’, to 
which we return later, requires ‘as close an approximation as possible of an acute anthropological 
reflexivity (…) requiring sensitivity to context (…) and an acceptance of cultural legitimacy, agency 
and authority.’ In sum, the works of the critical turn go a long way to revealing both the diverse 
interests and effects of  the agency of traditionally marginal local actors, allowing us to listen for the 
Accepted for publication by the Journal of International Political Theory 
  10 
voices of the subaltern, and go some way to addressing the silences that are constitutive of the field 
(Mac Ginty, 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013; Chandler, 2006). 
 
Nevertheless, what has been termed the ‘critique of the critique’, points to inconsistencies in the 
positions of many of the critical turn’s authors. For example, David Chandler (2015) points to the 
impasse of culture which permeates the work of the leading critical theorists. Similarly, Meera 
Sabaratnam (2013) and Giorgio Shani (2019) effectively point to what the former termed the ‘avatars 
of Eurocentrism’ which still loom large over these critical accounts. These avatars are manifested 
partly in the creation of the ‘local’ as an essential other to the West’s self who tellingly, as Elisa 
Randazzo (2016) notes, is also spatially determined. The ‘local’ in early accounts had little variation, 
allowing scholars to construe themselves as the magnanimous subjects who extend an ear to that 
other. In so doing, Chandler argues, they did not serve the interest of the subaltern. Instead, they 
opened the social and the ‘everyday’ to the incursion of power in the form of governmentality and 
biopolitics (Chandler and Richmond, 2015: 12-20). 
 
Conceptualising peace 
Though many critical peace theorists chose to focus on critique, some have also sought to provide 
alternative normative theories of peace and its preconditions. Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty 
are arguably the most influential of them. Here we mainly focus on the conceptualisation of peace 
and its preconditions entailed predominantly but not exclusively in their work. 
 
Up to the 1970s peace was generally understood as the absence of war. This conceptualisation 
admitted to a lot of interpretations accompanied by distinct preconditions (Richmond, 2005; Mac 
Ginty ,2011).  Johan Galtung (1969, 1990) challenged this conceptualisation, arguing that we must 
de-couple peace from war and give peace a distinct hypostasis: peace he argued is a state of 
emancipation, where direct, structural and cultural violence is absent, freeing people to live life as 
they choose. Many theorists in the critical turn adopt and some expand on Galtung’s 
conceptualisation. In particular, they focus on the local level and the plurality inherent therein, as the 
ideal space for constructing a genuinely emancipatory peace. Contra the teleological and apolitical 
‘liberal peace’, they did not specify the institutional form of peace. Furthermore, to circumvent the 
danger of depoliticisation, they stressed that peace must be conceptualised as both a state of 
emancipation and agonism which entails the permanence of tame conflict, as opposed to a state where 
conflict disappears. The particular type of agonism adopted is that theorised by William Connolly 
(1991:94) who argued that identity creation and the concomitant creation of difference entail cruelty 
and exclusion, while politics is  ‘the medium through which these ambiguities can be engaged and 
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confronted, shifted and stretched.’ Agonistic politics, in this account, entail a pluralisation of 
difference which ultimately enables ‘self-government, self-determination, empathy [and] care’ 
(Richmond, 2009: 570). In short, peace is conceptualised as a state where everyone is free to live as 
they choose, and which entails tame conflict amenable to the pluralisation of difference. This is a 
condition which admits to different institutional arrangements. 
 
Though early works assumed that peace defined thus was possible, criticism which stressed the 
permanence of power, led Richmond and Mac Ginty (2015) to argue that since power cannot be 
wished away, each order will inevitably institute exclusions and violence. Therefore, they admitted 
that emancipation for all was impossible. Despite this presumably ‘non-ideal’ limitation, they argue 
that peace should be conceptualised as a state of emancipation where these conditions disappear. This 
ideal peace can serve as a goal which will never be reached and as a way of accounting for the process 
by which agents are attempting to institute it. Here we should also note that unlike the ‘liberal peace’ 
this conceptualisation is not determined by the goal of inter-state peace. Indeed, it is contrary to liberal 
internationalism and presumes that local emancipatory peace will reverberate globally in ways which 
challenge the current state system (Richmond, 2009). 
 
On the face of i, this conceptualisation is consistent with anti-Pelagian premises since it is non-
teleological, does not hide the political nor the permanence of power, pluralism and conflict. 
However, retaining the conception of peace-as-emancipation, even as an unreachable ideal state, 
inevitably conjures the perfectionist spirit of Pelagianism (Rengger, 2017: 14) since it implies that 
critical peace theorists ‘believe that there is a “solution to the puzzle”— at least in principle’ 
(Rennger, 2016: 37). In short, retaining this conception of peace seems to presume that ideally the 
end of politics is perfection or salvation at both the domestic and international levels, as opposed to 
accepting that politics can have no other function than ‘keeping the boat afloat’. Defining peace as 
emancipation is, thus, inconsistent with their otherwise anti-Pelagian premises which necessarily 
recognise the impossibility of that goal. Retaining it as an ideal end, even while accepting the 
permanence of power, violence and exclusion, indicates an unwillingness to effectively deal with the 
consequences of this permanence for how we can conceptualise peace.  
 
The second element which makes up the concept of peace is pluralistic or even pluralising agonism. 
This pertains both to the interactions between local and international actors as well as to the 
interactions of local actors themselves, highlighting critical peace theorists’ commitment to a 
political, hence anti-Pelagian, understanding of peace-making as a whole. Furthermore, this addition 
is supported by empirical evidence gleaned from sustained studies of peaceful cooperation among 
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people who had either been on opposing sides during conflicts or were presumed to be so. These 
actors, theorists argue, often have a limited role due to their lack of power; however, it is cautiously 
argued that they are crucial in pushing for a pluralistic and emancipatory peace (Richmond, 2016). 
Nevertheless, agonism, as described here is a demanding type of politics, one which is predicated on 
a pre-political commitment to pluralisation, which is itself based upon subjectivities which are open 
to difference and change. This is obviously a more demanding type of politics than that of toleration, 
which demands that citizens not demonise otherness while interacting with them in matters of co-
existence (Hampshire, 1996) but does not require a significant engagement with difference or change. 
Conceptualising politics in the context of peace thus is predicated on focusing upon the better angels 
of our natures, and those groups who embody them, but seems to disregard those who don’t. 
Therefore, this conceptualisation tilts into Pelagianism because it defines peace in a way which 
disregards significant aspects and types of human behavior.  
 
The preconditions for peace, defined thusly, are rooted in the maxim that local legitimatory beliefs, 
institutions and processes are most important for building a sustainable-come-emancipatory peace. 
In his earlier work Richmond proposed that putting the liberal-peace-building-self in dialogue with 
the non-liberal-peace-building-other would produce a legitimate and possibly emancipatory peace 
which would necessarily be hybrid in character. A necessary precondition for this dialogue would be 
for the interveners to ‘check their power’, as it were, thus ameliorating biases (Richmond, 2009: 565-
68, 593). Mac Ginty (2010) in his work focused on the hidden transcripts of peace-making by 
focusing not on dialogue-qua-dialogue but on the indigenous and traditional methods of peace-
making and the way in which they relate to the ‘liberal peace’. Thus, critical peace theorists argued 
that we should focus on ‘the everyday’, (Richmond, 2009: 570-72) defined as the site where 
individuals navigate their way and find space for their activities. Focusing on it as a site of 
investigation, intervention and dialogue would allow scholars and international practitioners to 
harness already existing practices in the service of peace-building, thus turning subjects into active 
citizens, able to engage with the politics of self-government and self-determination. This, Richmond 
(2011, loc. 5041) argued would transform peace-building from a process of power-accumulation into 
‘a dialogic and pedagogic process which reconstructs the everyday according to how its subjects need 
and want to live’.  
 
These early theorisations of the preconditions of a legitimate peace, namely that it is based on a 
dialogue between (elite and non-elite) local and international actors which harnesses the ‘everyday’, 
were challenged by other critical scholars. They were criticized for inadvertently romanticising the 
essentially other and for being too problem-solving rather than critical, thus obscuring greater 
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structures of power inequality (Tadjbakhsh, 2011; Chandler, 2017). In the context of our reading of 
the critical turn, these works were perhaps more Pelagian than anti-Pelagian, retaining the belief in 
both perfectibility through an ideal form of politics (the ‘ideal’ dialogue of international and local 
actors) and in theory’s ability to provide a map for the journey.  
Furthermore, they are arguably  based on an ultimately apolitical conception of legitimacy which 
assumes that liberal legitimatory beliefs, which presuppose that one must find ‘a way to justify a 
political system to everyone who is required to live under it’ (Nagel, 1991: 33), could co-exist with 
non-liberal conceptions which reject this commitment. Moreover, critical theorists presumed that 
such illiberal beliefs, like faith-based beliefs which deny equal status to men and women or shun 
queerness, could be at least ideally reconciled with the ideal end of emancipation and with pluralising 
agonism. However, this is unlikely because emancipation presupposes that we treat people as ends in 
themselves rather than means to an end. Further, it demands that the polity (state or otherwise) acts 
to remove all violence, if it is to be legitimate. This in turn would be incompatible with secular and 
non-secular versions of the good life that seek to prescribe how people live in the service of achieving 
a particular end. The ethic of pluralisation would be similarly incompatible with such beliefs which 
are often predicated upon the exclusion of difference. Thus, early theorisation of the preconditions 
for a legitimate peace was predicated on a Pelagian blindness to the depth of conflict between existing 
versions of the good life, which has no prospect of being resolved.  
A second precondition for peace is that the order and institutions constructed be hybrid. This is a 
precondition which, similarly to the addition of agonism to the definition of peace, is partly 
descriptive. Indeed, procedural and institutional hybridity is a far more widespread phenomenon than 
agonism (Mac Ginty, 2010). On the other hand, as critics note (Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo, 2018; 
Millar, 2014), hybridity often appears as a prescriptive requirement for peace (Richmond, 2009; 
Johnson and Hutchison, 2012). Theoretically, this requirement is problematic due to the contradictory 
nature of the elements it suggests should be blended. For example, blending rule of law institutions 
which presume that all are equally subject to the law with traditional, often hierarchical, institutions 
which deny that, is unfeasible. Another incongruity potentially exists between traditional and liberal 
institutions, on the one hand, and the perfectionists and demanding ends of peace as it has been 
defined by the critical turn, on the other. In fact, empirical studies demonstrate that institutional 
hybridity does not act as a check against the establishment of coercive institutions or ensure the 
establishment of emancipatory ones (Simangan, 2018). Indeed, presuming that it could entails a 
characteristically Pelagian, because naïve, understanding of institutions. Finally, the precondition that 
institutions have a hybrid character entails a further slip into Pelagianism, since it is, however loosely, 
prescriptive, thus presupposing the notion that theory may indeed guide practice towards a 
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perfectionist end.   
The ‘critique of the critique’ led to a second wave of theorisations of the preconditions of peace. Later 
works, for example, recognise that the ‘local’ is not uniform nor necessarily a-liberal (Richmond, 
2011; Rampton and Nadarajah, 2017) and that power permeates the local as well as the global 
(Hughes et al., 2015; Richmond, 2016, Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015). They also warn against 
trying to construct hybrid orders, since local traditions are also not necessarily conducive to the end 
of emancipation (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2016). Elsewhere, Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013) 
acknowledged that the conceptualisation of peace as emancipatory and agonistic privileges ‘critical 
and resistant agencies’. These, they argue, may give rise to ‘emancipatory forms of peace that are 
open to alternatives and anti-hegemonic, bottom-up, freed from the constraints of statehood and 
imposed norms, and balancing needs with rights, rather than a homage to a hierarchical order’ 
(Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015: 184). In his work, Hartmut Behr (2019) argues for privileging 
particular local ontologies and practices which embrace a continual process of dialogue and 
articulation of the multiple meanings of difference. Richmond (2016) has also focused on ‘peace 
formation’ which takes place among increasingly connected, critical, subaltern actors who, he argues, 
do not only contest local power but the state system itself. While recognising the limited role of these 
actors due to their lack of power, it is cautiously argued that they are crucial in pushing for a pluralistic 
and emancipatory peace which would be ultimately legitimate. 
These works are even less prescriptive than earlier theorisations of peace and its preconditions, since 
they do not specify any method for legitimating peace nor the character of the institutions which are 
necessarily conducive to peace as emancipation, making these works more consistent with their anti-
Pelagian premises. At the same time, these efforts do not rid these theorisations of peace of their 
contradictions. For example, at this second stage of normative theorising, critical scholars were forced 
to specify the (few) types of subjectivities and political positions which are presupposed by agonistic 
and emancipatory peace. At the same time, they refrained from specifying which types of 
subjectivities and positions are excluded. Thus, this was an attempt to limit the scope of pluralism 
without explicitly doing so.  
These arguments point to the continuing incoherence at the center of the conceptualisation of peace 
developed in the context of the critical turn attempting, as it is, to retain both, a commitment to 
pluralism, and even pluralisation entailed in the adoption of Connolly’s model of agonism, and a 
commitment to the end of emancipation which is incompatible with many versions of the good life 
(See: Randanzo, 2016: 1355-59; Bargués-Pedreny, 2018). Put differently, these works theorise peace 
as embracing all understandings of the good –even aiming for the continual proliferation of 
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difference, while affirming a perfectionist end which must necessarily exclude many of these 
understandings. Indeed, it might be said that the concept of pluralising agonism itself is contradictory 
since its existence is necessarily predicated upon the exclusion of those understandings of the good 
which reject its premises. As I argue in the introduction, this is perhaps the most damning critique of 
the turn. This paradox persists, this article has shown, because critical peace theorists engaged in 
theorizing peace and its preconditions have been unable to exorcise the ghost of Pelagianism and the 
incoherence it generates for theories that begin from anti-Pelagian philosophical premises. The ghost 
is manifested in the persistence of teleological perfectionism in these accounts.  
Moreover, these theories continue to presume a demanding, reflexive type of subjectivity which 
cannot be assumed or prescribed, nor serve as the starting point of a theory of peace any more than 
the presumption of rational egoism can. As argued above, this element illustrates the fact that these 
theorisations of peace and its preconditions are predicated upon an excess of attention on actors which 
are admirable and confirm theorists values, and on inattention to those actors who don’t. A properly 
anti-Pelagian conception of peace and its preconditions must necessarily take both into consideration. 
The effect of the contradictions inherent in this conceptualisation of peace is manifested at the level 
of practice. Most empirical studies of peace-building concur that the United Nations and individual 
Western states have made a turn to local contexts tempering their Pelagian ambition and ushering in 
different understandings of peace. For example, Chandler (2017) notes that there has been a notable 
switch from ‘conflict resolution’ to ‘conflict management’ as a goal for interventions, which 
occasioned practices like encouraging inclusive dialogue among local actors and adopting the 
framework of resilience5 to deal with pre- and post-conflict environments. This change indicates that 
Pelagian simplification of post-conflict environments and local actors and notions of politics as the 
means to salvation have disappeared from the stated aims, strategies and mandates of international 
organisations and powerful states. Indeed, in their respective works, Chandler (and Richmond, 2015: 
12-20) and Pol Bargués-Pedreny (2018: 106-08) argue that international peace-making agents have 
adopted the theoretical framework of the critical turn and by extension their conceptualization of 
peace. Unlike Richmond (Chandler and Richmond, 2015: 1-12), they do not see this as a reason for 
celebration. Instead, Chandler argues that this switch has resulted in extending the reach of power 
while obscuring its contours. For Bargués-Pedreny (2018: 143), the most pressing issue is that these 
practices threaten the transvaluation of peace, whereby success at reaching a final solution, which 
presumably would limit pluralism and institute necessary exclusions, is seen as a failure and the 
 
5 Approaches which seek to use culture as a toolkit for peace-building and involve local (elite and civil-society) and 
other actors (NGOs, donors, IOs) in flexible and ever-changing arrangements which seek to create polities which can 
withstand and absorb challenges and shocks. 
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failure to do so as a success. Both theorists suggest that in practice the adoption of the critical turn’s 
understanding of peace leads to increasing interventionism, dependency and a deferral of sovereignty. 
 
A theory of peace and its preconditions 
Though the critical turn in peace theory has improved upon the Pelagianism of the ‘liberal peace’ by 
affirming the impossibility of universal solutions and permanence of conflict and power, a coherent 
and consistent conception of ‘peace’ remains elusive. It has been argued that the reason for this is 
that critical peace theory and thought has fallen into one of the traps anti-Pelagian thought tends to: 
sliding into the perfectionist and often naive notions characteristic of Pelagianism. This section 
outlines an alternative conception of peace and its preconditions. This conception follows anti-
Pelagian philosophical premises: that human beings and institutions are complex, that politics can at 
best help us ‘keep the boat afloat’ and that political theory should not aim to guide practice.  Thus, 
the alternative sketched below is an attempt at theorising peace from ‘the outside’ as Rengger put it, 
as opposed to providing a theorisation which might help us ‘do’ better. Since peace is complex and 
rests on a number of general political patterns, I draw upon the works of various anti-Pelagian thinkers 
discussed by Rengger who have theorised these convincingly. Here it is worth noting once more that 
I do not purport to offer the final word on peace, nor the only possible one. However, my contention 
is that the theory developed here is plausible, consistent with its premises and the facts and coherent 
within itself, and that it provides a way out of the critical turn’s current impasse.   
 
We begin by defining peace not as emancipation but as a disposition to solve conflicts in a peaceful 
manner. This definition echoes Hobbes (1968: 56) who stated that ‘the nature of War consisteth not 
in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to 
the contrary. All other time is PEACE.’ Furthermore, it is also reminiscent of Kenneth Boulding’s 
(1978: 13) definition of the stable peace as ‘a situation in which the probability of war is so small that 
it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved.’ This definition presupposes 
that as Rengger (2016: 53)  put it ‘Peace may not always be attainable, and sometimes (…) might not 
be preferable, but for the most part, for most of us, most of the time, it will be’.  It also has a temporal 
dimension: peace is not a momentary state, it exists only when a long-term disposition to solve 
conflicts peacefully exists.  
 
The discerning reader might point out that this definition remains open to both perfectionist and 
cynical theorisations of the preconditions of peace, since such a state can be achieved through 
domination or be interpreted as necessarily emancipatory. To avoid these pitfalls we further specify 
that peace is a state where those involved are predisposed to solve their conflicts in a peaceful manner 
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while being free of widespread violent coercion or the fear/threat of such coercion. Characterising 
peace thus recognises that the rule of law or other legal systems, necessarily entail coercive elements. 
It also draws from the anti-utopian position, common to republicanism (Petit, 1997: 1-128), dystopic 
liberalism (Shklar, 2004: 149-66) and realism (Morgenthau, 1946: 168-203; Williams, 2005: 1-18), 
that coercion which is productive of arbitrary violence and/or fear is universally bad, since it stops 
people from flourishing. This definition does not preclude the possibility of improvements, in the 
form of addressing injustices according to the common sense of the times, but it is not premised upon 
this. It is also not premised on the disappearance of hegemony, as accounts in the critical turn are. 
Consequently, peace in this account is modest while avoiding the trap of being equated with a state 
of widespread domination. 
 
The first precondition of peace defined thusly is the mutual recognition of all participants – 
individuals and/or groups- as co-citizens. Stuart Hampshire (1996: 150) argues that such recognition 
is constitutive of political relationships which have always entailed balanced adversary thinking. If 
adversaries are not recognized, or their opinions entertained, even if only to be rebuked, then there is 
no political relationship. In cases of lack of recognition and of institutions with procedures to 
accommodate how different opinions will be weighed against each other, domination ensues 
(Hampshire, 1996: 155). Here it should be noted that this type of recognition does not promise a final 
resolution or that conflict disappears since, as Hampshire put it in his Tanner lectures, ‘there will 
never be a harmony in the soul or in the city’ (Hampshire, 1996: 147). Failure to recognize this would 
entail a slide into a perfectionist anti-Pelagianism which presumes that the better angels of our nature 
could be relied upon to prevail, if only favorable conditions are put in place.  
 
This type of recognition is of course presupposed in the critical turn’s accounts we examined, though 
those accounts go even further by demanding not just recognition of co-citizens but constant self-
reflexivity. As we have argued that is a demanding, if not naïve, conception of the political 
subjectivity presupposed by peace. Indeed, despite the fact that the precondition specified here is 
more modest than that entailed in the critical turn, it still remains demanding. This is evident when 
considering the context of conflict-ravaged polities like Yemen or even relatively pacified post-
conflict ones like Cyprus. In both these cases this type of recognition is not forthcoming. In Yemen, 
marginalised agents, including women and the young, were simultaneously excluded while being 
formally included in the National Dialogue Conference, since established elites refused to discuss 
politics openly with them (Gaston, 2014). In Cyprus, the long peace-making process between Greek 
Cypriots, represented by the government of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, and 
Turkish Cypriots, attests partly to the difficulties of reaching and then codifying recognition. At the 
Accepted for publication by the Journal of International Political Theory 
  18 
same time, the backlash against the candidacy and election of a Turkish-Cypriot for one of the six 
Cypriot seats in the 2019 European parliamentary elections, attests to the majority’s unwillingness to 
recognize the other, emboldened by the populist tactics of opportunistic elites (Psyllides, 2019). This 
leads us to argue that the feasibility of our first precondition may rest upon two supplementary ones. 
The first that the elites must find peace thus defined to be superior to war or to mere pacification, for 
the pursuit of their ends (Cottrell, 1955). The second supplementary precondition borrows from 
Margaret Canovan’s (1998) critique of liberalism which, she argued, omitted the crucial role of 
nationalism in the establishment of liberal polities. Following Canovan’s argument and recent work 
on the relational aspects of peace (Söderström et. al., 2019), we argue that the sort of recognition 
postulated here often depends upon the existence or creation of a common corporate identity which 
creates a bond and relation of fellowship among participants.  
 
Since formal political recognition does not make power disappear, the second precondition of peace 
is the exercise of prudence in constructing institutions. Prudence as a virtue has long been theorised 
and contested (See: Kratochwil, 2018). While resolving debates around the subject is beyond the 
remit of the article, prudence, rather than the precise character (hybrid or otherwise) of institutions, 
is highlighted as a precondition, because building such institutions cannot be left to rationalistic 
formulas nor to naïve hopes that hybrid institutions will, by virtue of their character, produce the 
conditions for a non-coercive order. Consequently, a precondition for peace is that in building 
institutions we follow David Hume’s (1742) maxim that ‘in contriving any system of government, 
and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a 
knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest.’ Hume’s argument allows us 
to sidestep debates about who can be prudent while clearly outlining the character of prudent 
institutions: that they effectively put in place checks and balances on power. This leaves open the 
processes by which such institutions are constructed as well as their precise form which is historically 
and contextually contingent (See: Hampshire, 1996: 155; Geuss, 2008; Oakeshott, 1975). Therefore, 
this precondition avoids the pitfall that critical peace theorists highlight: the supposition that the only 
political and institutional arrangements conducive to peace are the ones developed in the West and 
that these can be transplanted elsewhere. Furthermore, it also speaks to Rengger’s (2016) concern 
with dispelling the notion that only particular political and institutional forms facilitate peace. At the 
same time, this precondition postulates a thin but also demanding end to such processes. Finally, this 
definition is particularly attractive since it rests on the pretense that everyone is a knave -rather than 
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on unsupportable anthropological certainty; a pretense which we may abandon in all other aspects of 
our lives.6 
 
The third precondition of peace, one that critical theorists rightly focus upon, is that the order 
constructed and its institutions must have the character of being legitimate whereby, legitimacy is 
defined as the recognition of the authority of a polity which engenders obligations (Oakeshott, 1975). 
Legitimacy is constitutive of peace since it is presupposed by the disposition to solve conflicts in a 
peaceful manner. Put differently, if most find the institutions of their polity to be illegitimate, 
especially those institutions which are central in conflict resolution, trust-building and security, they 
would not be obliged to follow the rules. In these circumstances, violent conflict would be highly 
probable. As with the shape of institutions, the sources of legitimacy are historically and spatially 
contingent. Furthermore, the basis of a polity’s legitimacy is never set or finalised; instead it is 
constantly changing in conditions of -tame- conflict and unequal power relations (Sleat, 2016).  
 
In the place of the critical turn’s conception of legitimacy, which requires pluralisation and 
difference-minded ontologies and practices, we adopt a more modest understanding based on John 
Horton’s modus vivendi theory of legitimacy. Contra the demanding conceptions of legitimacy 
adopted by critical peace theorists, Horton (2010: 443) argues that to be legitimate ‘a particular set 
of political arrangements (…) has to be broadly ‘acceptable’ or ‘agreeable’ to those who are party to 
it, even if only reluctantly so and for diverse reasons.’ Crucially, he notes that a modus vivendi 
arrangement is only legitimate if ‘uncoerced acceptance is widespread and covers the majority in the 
groups who are party to it.’ The reasons or beliefs that legitimize an order, he argues, may be ‘moral, 
intellectual, cultural, pragmatic, etc., as well as self-interested’. This theory of legitimacy is 
simultaneously pragmatic and broadly inclusive. It is pragmatic in recognizing and providing for the 
multifarious nature of compromise at any time in the life of a polity which recognises that 
compromise does not only involve considerations of one’s conception of the good but also other less 
elevated, but not less important, reasons. Simultaneously, it is inclusive because it adequately 
provides for pluralism in the interrelated understanding of oneself and of the good, which can 
encompass subjects who are not only liberal or other-minded. This theorisation does not prescribe 
how to go about creating a legitimate peace but it specifies its character which excludes coercion 
between and within groups. Thus, a precondition for peace is that the majority in the groups that 
make-up the polity finds it agreeable, thus legitimate, for a variety of reasons. 
 
 
6 For this distinction, I thank Professor Noel O’Sullivan. 
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The fourth and final precondition of peace is that it must exclude other possibilities. This precondition 
is of course implied but unacknowledged in Mac Ginty and Richmond’s (2013) work as we saw 
above.  Peace defined thusly, excludes the possibility of dominating orders and as such must exclude 
those who seek to institute these by destroying it. Peace, therefore, necessarily limits pluralism 
because its end is a state where those who are part of it are predisposed to solve their conflict 
peacefully out-with widespread dominating coercion or the fear of such coercion. However, this 
entails that some agents -for example in Yemen some members of the Al Qaeda of the Arabian 
Peninsula, would be excluded and would thus experience the order as dominating. One might say that 
this is paradoxically since peace here is defined against domination while being unable to escape it. 
In fact, peace has been conceived as a state which precludes widespread domination and arbitrary 
coercion. This qualification allows for this necessary precondition to any order: that it must exclude 
that which seeks to destroy it.7  
 
Conclusion 
As a way to get to the root of the inconsistencies in the theorisation of peace entailed in the critical 
turn and thus to break through our current impasse, this article drew upon Nicholas Rengger’s 
systematic study and characterisation of anti-Pelagian thought to analyse and evaluate the critical 
turn. I argued that the turn is anti-Pelagian in character since it is, in principle, non-teleological, 
sceptical of the relation of theory and practice and acknowledges the complexity of human nature and 
institutions. After establishing that the critical turn lacks a theory of peace and its preconditions which 
consistently follows from its anti-Pelagian premises and which is internally coherent, the article 
sketched an alternative which follows Rengger’s anti-Pelagianism in seeking to understand peace 
‘from the outside’, thus allowing us to address the gap at the center of the critical turn.  
 
Consequently, peace has been defined as a state where the people involved are predisposed to solve 
their conflicts in a peaceful manner while being free of widespread dominating coercion or the 
fear/threat of such coercion. The conception sketched here is consistently anti-Pelagian in as much 
as it follows from non-teleological, non-utopian, sceptical and non-voluntarist presuppositions. First, 
it presumes that human nature and politics are inescapably complex. Secondly, it is based on the non-
utopian desire to avoid the universally bad state of fear, arbitrary violence and dominating coercion. 
Thirdly, it presupposes a distinction between political theory and practice. Peace, in this account, is 
both similar to but also markedly different from the critical turn’s theorisations of peace which, while 
cognizant of the inescapability of politics, posit the maximalist end of emancipation and the adoption 
 
7 Debating the manner of the exclusion is beyond our remit but you can find a discussion of this in the work of Chantal 
Mouffe (1993) and Sleat (2013b), among others. 
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of a hugely demanding type of politics, pluralising agonism, while falling into incoherence and 
prescribing ever more demanding conditions for its attainment especially as these relate to the agents 
and subjects of peace. At the same time, it also avoids the pitfalls of equating peace with a state of 
widespread domination. Following Rengger, we must emphasise that this conception is not designed 
to help us decide when peace is desirable or how to institute it, and nor do I claim that it is the only 
possible conception of peace. Nevertheless, I argue that it is plausible, consistent and coherent and 
that it can help us move our debates beyond their current impasse. Finally, this theorisation arguably 
escapes the ever-present temptation of Pelagianism by defining peace modestly while pointing to the 
messiness and indeterminacy of politics and by leaving space for political judgement as to when 
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